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Climate Change Policy, the Federal Budget Surplus,
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| Figure 1 | Annual Impact of Reducing U.S. CO2 Emissions
on U.S. GDP, 2008-2012 Percent of GDP |
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| Note: These estimates assume emission reductions begin
around 2005. Source: Margo Thorning, "The Impact of the Kyoto Protocol on U.S. Economic Growth and Projected Budget Surpluses," testimony before the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, 25 March 1999, 106th Congress, 1st session. |
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Impact on Federal Budget Surplus
In light of the current debate about how to use the projected federal
budget surpluses, policymakers need to consider the potentially large
negative impact on GDP growth and federal budget receipts of proposals
that address the potential threat of global warming by requiring sharp,
near-term cutbacks in CO2 emissions. A report by the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) shows that if economic growth slows relative to the
baseline forecast and GDP were 4 percent lower in 2009, the projected
on-budget (excluding Social Security contributions) surplus virtually
disappears, dropping from $178 billion to only $18 billion (see Figure
2). Similarly, if GDP falls by 3 percent, the surplus declines to $58
billion in 2009 (2009 is the last year of the current CBO forecast). Therefore,
implementation of the Kyoto Protocol would make it much more difficult
to sustain tax cuts, "save" Social Security, promote the retirement
security of the baby boom generation, or achieve other public policy goals,
and could require sharp changes in fiscal policy in order to avoid deficit
spending.
| Figure 2 | Reduction in Federal On-Budget Surplus in 2009 Due to Lower
GDP Caused by CO2 Emission
Reductions Dollars in billions |
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| Note: "On-budget" surplus excludes Social
Security and postal service contributions. Calculations based on "The Economic and Budget Outlook: An Update," Congressional Budget Office, July 1. |
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Impact of International Emission Trading
International trading of emissions permits would reduce the cost of near-term
reductions considerably, although experts agree that full global trading
(involving developing countries such as China and India) is unlikely in
the near term and that many complexities remain. Even if developing countries
agree to participate fully, two major obstacles to developing a trading
system would remain: allocating CO2 emissions rights and distributing
the revenue (Ellerman 1999). In addition, both developed and developing
countries may find it difficult, if not impossible, to sell CO2
emissions credits because of energy's vital role in economic growth. The
costs of tradable permits to emit a ton of carbon are another measure
of the burden that near-term emissions reduction would place on the U.S.
economy. These costs-in effect taxes-which vary depending upon how much
trading takes place, range from about $120 per metric ton to $348 per
metric ton for reducing emissions to 7 percent below 1990 levels. The
Administration (CEA)'s estimated tradable permit price, which assumes
full global trading, is only $14 per ton. (Note that the Administration
contemplates further reductions beyond the Kyoto target.)
Impact on Wage Growth and Consumers
U.S. consumers suffer declines in wage growth and the distribution of
income worsens under CO2 stabilization policies. Professor
Yohe estimates that reducing emissions to 1990 levels (President Clinton's
pre-Kyoto target) would reduce wage growth by 5 to 10 percent annually,
and the lowest quintile of the population would see its share of the economic
"pie" shrink by about 10 percent (Yohe
1997). Texas A&M University professor John Moroney estimates that
U.S. living standards would fall by 15 percent under the Kyoto Protocol
compared to the base case energy forecast (Moroney 1999).
U.S. households also face much higher prices for energy under near-term
stabilization. A range of estimates by various experts concludes that
prices for gasoline would rise from almost 30 percent to over 50 percent
and that electricity prices would go up by anywhere from 50 percent over
80 percent (see Figure 3). The Administration (CEA) predictions (a 2.7
percent increase in gasoline prices and 3.4 percent higher prices for
electricity) are far below those of widely respected climate policy modelers.
| Figure 3 | Annual U.S. Household Energy Costs: Impact of Reducing CO2
Emissions, 2008-2012 Percent change from base case |
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| Source: Margo Thorning, "The Impact of the Kyoto Protocol on U.S. Economic Growth and Projected Budget Surpluses," testimony before the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, 25 March 1999, 106th Congress, 1st session. | |
Competitiveness for Industry and Agriculture
U.S. competitiveness also declines under near-term stabilization policies.
Professor Manne and Dr. Richels analyzed this question, and their model
results suggest that the Kyoto Protocol could lead to serious competitive
problems for energy-intensive sector (EIS) producers in the United States.
Meeting the emissions targets in the Protocol would lead to significant
reductions in output and employment among EIS producers, and there would
be offsetting increases in countries with low energy costs. U.S. output
of energy-intensive products such as autos, steel, paper, and chemicals
could be 15 percent less than under the reference case by 2020 (Manne
and Richels 1999). In contrast, countries such as China, India, and Mexico
would increase their output of energy-intensive products. In its present
form, the Protocol could lead to acrimonious conflicts between those who
advocate free international trade and those who advocate a low-carbon
environment, Professor Manne and Dr. Richels conclude.
U.S. agriculture would also lose competitiveness if the United States
were to comply with the Kyoto Protocol. A study based on the DRI model
by Terry Francl of the American Farm Bureau Federation, Richard Nadler
of K.C. Jones Monthly, and Joseph Bast of the Heartland Institute
(FNB) predicts that implementation of the Protocol would cause higher
fuel oil, motor oil, fertilizer, and other farm operating costs (Francl,
Nadler, and Bast 1999, Table 2, 188). This would mean higher consumer
food prices and greater demand for public assistance with higher costs.
In addition, by increasing the energy costs of farm production in America
while leaving them unchanged in developing countries, the Kyoto Protocol
would cause U.S. food exports to decline and imports to rise. Reduced
efficiency of the world food system could add to a political backlash
against free trade policies at home and abroad. Further, the higher energy
costs, notes the FNB analysis, together with the reduced domestic and
export demand, could lead to a very severe decline in investment in agriculture
and a sharp increase in farm consolidation. Small farm numbers likely
would decline much more rapidly than under baseline conditions, while
investment even in larger commercial farms likely would stagnate or decline.
The FNB analysis, which concludes that U.S. agriculture would be adversely
affected by the Kyoto Protocol, stands in sharp contrast to the May, 1999,
report by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), which finds that
the Kyoto Protocol would have "relatively modest" impacts on
U.S. agriculture.
The USDA report is seriously flawed for two reasons, according to a new
analysis by Mr. Francl. First, the USDA report relies on the unrealistic
assumptions about the impact of the Kyoto Protocol on energy prices contained
in the Administration's 1998 CEA analysis (see discussion below). Second,
the USDA report makes the heroic assumption that U.S. farmers will have
unrestricted access to carbon credit trading (Francl 1999).
Flaws in the Administration (CEA)'s Economic Analysis of the Kyoto
Protocol
The Administration's July, 1998, economic analysis of the impact of reducing
CO2 emissions to 7 percent below 1990 levels, prepared by the
CEA, is seriously flawed for three reasons.
First, the Administration (CEA)'s cost estimates assume
full global trading in tradable emissions permits (including trading with
China and India). Most top climate policy experts conclude that this assumption
is extremely unrealistic since the Protocol does not require developing
nations (who will be responsible for most of the growth in future CO2
emissions, see Figure 4) to reduce their emissions, and many have stated
that they will not do so. Second, the Administration
(CEA)'s cost estimates assume that an international CO2 emissions
trading system can be developed and operating by 2008-2012. This assumption
is unrealistic, according to Professor Ellerman (1999)'s analysis. Third,
the cost estimates are based on the Second Generation Model (SGM) developed
by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. The SGM appears to assume costless,
instantaneous adjustments in all markets; the model is not appropriate
for analyzing the Protocol's near-term economic impacts, according to
CRA's Dr. Montgomery (1999). As Massachusetts Institute of Technology
professor Henry Jacoby observes, there are no short-term technical changes
that would significantly lower U.S. carbon emissions (Jacoby 1999).
| Figure 4 | Global Carbon Emissions: Reference Case |
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| Source: Alan S. Manne and Richard G. Richels, "The Kyoto Protocol: A Cost-Effective Strategy for Meeting Environmental Objectives?" in Climate Change Policy: Practical Strategies to Promote Economic Growth and Environmental Quality (Washington, D.C.: American Council for Capital Formation Center for Policy Research, 1999), pp. 3-23. | |
Tax Policy to Encourage Voluntary Action to Reduce CO2
Emissions
Current U.S. tax policy treats capital formation, including investments
that increase energy efficiency and reduce pollution, harshly compared
to other industrialized countries and to our own recent past. For example,
before the 1986 Tax Reform Act (TRA '86), the United States had one of
the best capital cost recovery systems in the world.
Under the strongly pro-investment tax regime in effect from 1981 to 1985,
the present value of cost recovery allowances for wastewater treatment
facilities used in pulp and paper production was approximately 100 percent
(meaning that the deductions were the equivalent of an immediate write-off
of the entire cost of the equipment), according to analysis by Arthur
Andersen LLP.
Under TRA '86, the present value for wastewater treatment facilities fell
to 81 percent, dropping the U.S. capital cost recovery system to near
the bottom of an eight-country international survey (see Table 1). Allowances
for scrubbers used in the production of electricity were 90 percent before
TRA '86; the present value fell to 55 percent after TRA '86. As is true
in the case of productive equipment, both the loss of the investment tax
credit and the lengthening of depreciable lives enacted in TRA '86 raised
effective tax rates on new investment in pollution control and energy-efficient
equipment. Slower capital cost recovery means that equipment embodying
new technology and energy efficiency will not be put in place as rapidly
as it would under a more favorable tax code. A variety of tax incentives
such as partial expensing, accelerated depreciation, tax-exempt bond financing,
or more generous loss carrybacks that reduce the cost of capital for voluntary
efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions could be more effective than
the "credit for early action" regulatory framework proposal
currently before Congress.
| Table 1 | International Comparison of the Present Value
of Pollution Control Equipment As a percent of cost |
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| Wastewater Treatment for Chemical Production | Wastewater Treatment for Pulp and Paper Equipment | Scrubbers Used In Electricity Plants | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| United States | ||||
| 1985 Law | 100.1 | 100.1 | 89.7 | |
| MACRS1 | 85.2 | 80.8 | 54.5 | |
| AMT2 | 83.0 | 78.0 | 54.5 | |
| Brazil | 74.7 | 74.7 | 79.4 | |
| Canada | 85.3 | 85.3 | 85.3 | |
| Germany | 71.8 | 69.7 | 68.9 | |
| Japan | 84.6 | 83.7 | 82.4 | |
| Korea (w/3% ITC) |
95.2 | 93.9 | 92.2 | |
| Singapore | 91.7 | 91.7 | 91.7 | |
| Taiwan | 147.0 | 147.0 | 147.0 | |
| Notes: 1. MACRS = Modified Accelerated Cost Recovery
System (current law) for regular taxpayers. 2. AMT = Alternative minimum tax (current law, Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997). Source: Stephen R. Corrick and Gerald M. Godshaw, "AMT Depreciation: How Bad Is Bad?" in Economic Effects of the Corporate Alternative Minimum Tax (Washington, D.C.: American Council for Capital Formation Center for Policy Research, September 1991). Updated by Arthur Andersen LLP, Office of Federal Tax Services, Washington, D.C., January 1998. |
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Strategies for the Future
If, as knowledge of climate systems increases, policy changes to reduce
CO2 emissions become necessary, these changes should be implemented
in a way that minimizes damage to the U.S. economy. Above all, experts
agree that voluntary measures clearly and cost-effectively reduce the
growth in greenhouse gas emissions, as the U.S. Second National Communication
to the Framework Convention on Climate Change noted in 1997. Modifications
to U.S. tax policy that reduce the cost of capital for energy-efficient
investment should be part of the voluntary measures.
Reducing global CO2 emissions should be a gradual process,
according to Pacific Northwest National Laboratory's Dr. Jae Edmonds,
Mr. James Dooley, and Mr. Marshall Wise (1997). Moreover, a new study
by Dr. Edmonds, Mr. Dooley, and Dr. Sonny Kim (1999) concludes that the
introduction of carbon capture and sequestration from central power facilities,
the introduction of hydrogen fuel cells as an option for both power generation
and transport, sequestration of carbon in the soil, and afforestation
and reforestation would enable the economy to rely less heavily on carbon-neutral
technologies such as commercial biomass harvesting and solar power (which
are at an early stage in their technological development) to achieve a
particular concentration level. For example, carbon sequestration at power
plants and fuel cell use for electric power generation and transportation
could cut the present discounted cost of satisfying the 550 parts per
million by volume constraint by more than 60 percent.
Conclusion
In short, the consensus of these noted climate policy scholars is clear.
Given the need to maintain strong U.S. economic growth to address such
challenges as a growing population, "saving" Social Security,
the retirement of the baby boom generation, and a persistent trade deficit,
policymakers need to weigh carefully the Kyoto Protocol's negative economic
impacts and its failure to engage developing nations in meaningful action.
Adopting a thoughtfully timed climate change policy-based on accurate
science, improved climate models, global participation, and new technology-is
essential, both to U.S. and global economic growth and to eventual stabilization
of the carbon concentration in the atmosphere, if growing scientific understanding
indicates such a policy is needed.
References
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the Framework Convention on Climate Change by the United States. Wash.,
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