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Long-Term Energy Technology: Needs and Opportunities
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| Figure 1 | WRE Emissions Trajectories Consistent With Alternative CO2 Concentration Ceilings |
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Global Energy Systems With and Without an Emissions Ceiling
Experts are virtually unanimous in their expectation that future technologies
will reduce energy intensity and carbon emissions during the twenty-first
century. Power generating facilities in the future can be anticipated
to be more efficient than at present. Similarly, changes in the composition
and efficiency of future activities should provide a source of decreasing
energy intensity. While models generally treat technological change as
if it materialized by magic, in the real world it is energy R&D that
provides the technological catalyst.
However, the relationship between R&D and technological change has
proved difficult for researchers to predict.2 The current analysis
does not attempt to develop a cause-and-effect representation for R&D
and energy technology. Rather, we consider changes in the global energy
system that might be anticipated under various policy regimes aimed at
stabilizing atmospheric concentrations, and, more importantly, we attempt
to identify those areas in the energy system where technical performance
will be at a premium.
Coal, Oil, and Gas Production
We start by using the MiniCAM integrated assessment model to explore two
future scenarios, factoring in interactions between population, economic
activity, energy, agriculture, land use, greenhouse gas emissions, and
atmospheric dispositions. The first scenario, Coal Bridge to the Future
(CBF), assumes a transition from the present domination of oil and gas
to a future dominated by coal (the dominant energy resource globally in
terms of reserves). The second, Oil and Gas Forever (OGF), assumes that
oil and gas can be economically attractive in the future, continuing their
domination as fuels.
The principal difference between the CBF and OGF scenarios is the technology
assumed for extracting unconventional oil and gas resources. In the OGF
scenario, unconventional oil and gas resources, including methane hydrates
(clathrates), are initially available at oil prices of $20 per barrel,
with technological change lowering costs at 1 percent per year. In the
CBF scenario, these resources are available at $50 per barrel with technological
progress proceeding at only 0.5 percent per year. While the same resources
are available in all scenarios, differences in technology assumptions
determine relative economic performance.
Both of these energy worlds evolve against a background of continued productivity
improvement in energy production, transformation, and end-use. Both scenarios
are interesting to climate policymakers. The world can either continue
its economic development using oil and gas as the core fuels, or it can
transition to coal as the core fuel. In both cases, other energy forms
such as solar energy play important and even growing roles. However, the
backbone of the world's energy system remains fossil fuels.
Our two reference cases, CBF and OGF, exhibit continued growth in fossil
fuel emissions that eventually is viewed as inconsistent with the stabilization
of CO2 concentrations. However, because we do not know at what
level concentrations will be stabilized, we analyze constraints that result
in 450 ppmv, 550 ppmv, 650 ppmv, and 750 ppmv concentrations as well as
the reference case of unrestrained carbon accumulation. We compute the
cost of achieving each of these concentration objectives under a policy
regime that assumes all nations participate, regardless of economic development,
and that there may be compensating transfers of income among nations.
This strategy minimizes the cost of emissions mitigation at every point
in time over a longer period of time. However, it should be noted that
the cost of stabilizing carbon concentrations early in the twenty-first
century would be significantly greater than doing so gradually. Cost also
would be higher if a significant portion of the world did not participate
in this effort. Here is a look at how emissions, concentrations, land-use,
and other factors essential to the world's energy system might change
and various energy technologies develop.
Commercial Biomass Energy
In the MiniCAM model, modern commercial biomass energy is produced in
the context of overall agriculture and land-use management decision making.
Land is partitioned between managed and unmanaged components. An expansion
of the managed component typically has carbon emissions consequences.
Thus the expansion of commercial biomass production implies that land-use
patterns must change. Land must be acquired, with some of the land coming
through competition with other activities within the managed land system
and some coming at the expense of net intrusion into unmanaged ecosystems.
The cost of producing commercial biomass varies with the state of biomass
technology, the level of production (land costs depend upon overall demands
for land), the technology for producing competing agricultural and sylvacultural
products, and the demands for competing agricultural and sylvacultural
products.
Electric Power Generation
Fossil fuel electric power generation is assumed to improve continuously
between 2000 and 2095. It reaches an efficiency of transformation of 0.67
by 2095. Other forms of power generation also improve. The busbar cost
of power declines rapidly between 1997 and 2035 but remains relatively
stable thereafter. In 1997 the cost is assumed to be $0.52 per kilowatt
hour but has fallen to $0.06 per kilowatt hour by 2035. Further decreases
are modest, with the final cost reaching $0.05 per kilowatt hour in 2095.
Nuclear power is assumed to be phased out in Western Europe and North
America, but remains an option in the remainder of the world. In regions
where it is available, costs are assumed to decline at an average annual
rate of 0.5 percent per year. Fusion power is not considered in this exercise,
but holds potential for contributing to a low-carbon-emission future.
Hydro-electric power is limited by available resources.
The two base or reference scenarios paint different pictures of the global
energy system, even though total primary energy and total carbon emissions
are similar (see Figure 2). In CBF, the transition from conventional oil
and gas to coal is accompanied by an increase in the price of oil and
natural gas during the first half of the twenty-first century. This leads
to a lower future energy consumption in end-use applications but relatively
high primary energy demands and growing carbon emissions.
| Figure 2 | Reference Case Energy Emissions for the CBF and OGF Scenarios |
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In the OGF scenario, oil and gas prices remain low because usable resources
are never exhausted. The lower energy prices imply a higher level of final
energy consumption, but the lower carbon content of the primary energy
inputs to the system leave carbon emissions similar to those of the CBF
scenario. We also note that the lower energy prices imply a smaller contribution
by renewable energy forms.
Carbon Emission Reductions
The requirement to reduce carbon emissions (shown in Figure 1) changes
energy-use patterns relative to the base case shown in Figure 2. As the
CO2concentration constraint tightens from 750 ppmv to 450 ppmv,
changes in the global energy system become more pronounced. For example,
in the CBF case the scarce resources of conventional oil and gas continue
to be used in all but the 450 ppmv ceiling, where a slight decrease in
cumulative use is observed. However, coal use is constrained to mitigate
carbon emissions.
In the OGF case the scale of change in the energy system is somewhat greater
than in the CBF case. More of the world's energy system is based on oil
and gas in OGF than in CBF and less on coal, the changes that occur in
the energy system being required to satisfy a carbon concentration ceiling
that consequently requires reductions in the scale of both coal and gas
production. Renewable, nuclear, and conservation (defined as the reduction
in scale of the energy system relative to the reference case) all increase
under CO2 concentration ceiling cases. Conservation provides
about half of the change in the energy system and reduces the scale of
that system considerably.
Note that the bulk of emissions mitigation occurs in the second half of
the next century for all scenarios and that no mitigation is required
before 2005 (see Table 1). For example, under the 450 ppmv scenario, a
cumulative total of 211 billion metric tons of carbon must be removed
from the emission stream over the 2005-2050 time period. Note also that
the lower the concentration constraint, the higher the cumulative emissions
mitigation and the greater the proportion of emissions mitigation that
occurs in the first half of the next century. The difference between cumulative
emissions mitigation in the first half of the twenty-first century with
a 450 ppmv ceiling and a 750 ppmv ceiling is almost an order of magnitude.
| Table 1 | Cumulative Emission Mitigation Required for
Alternative CO2 Concentration
Constraints Over the Period 2000-2095 (Billions of metric tons of carbon) |
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Time period & scenario |
450 ppmv | 550 ppmv | 650 ppmv | 750 ppmv |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2005-2050 CBF | 211 | 87 | 43 | 25 |
| 2005-2050 OGF | 208 | 84 | 40 | 22 |
| 2050-2095 CBF | 668 | 480 | 344 | 264 |
| 2050-2095 OGF | 652 | 464 | 328 | 248 |
Moreover, while the harvesting of commercial biomass would benefit farmers
by increasing the demand for crops, this trend would raise food prices,
cause unmanaged lands to be brought into production, and increase land-use
carbon emissions (relative to the reference case) because the average
carbon content of biomass crops is lower than that of unmanaged ecosystems.
The value of carbon increases over time for all the carbon concentration
ceilings. Costs start modestly, at about $9 per metric ton (CBF, 750 ppmv)
to $105 per metric ton (OGF, 450 ppmv) in 2020, and rise substantially
by the end of the century, to about $125 per metric ton (CBF, 750 ppmv)
to some $1,179 per metric ton (OGF, 450 ppmv) in 2095 (see Figure 3).
| Figure 3 | Value of Carbon for Alternative Atmospheric CO2 Constraints, 2005-2095 |
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Allowing Carbon Capture and Sequestration
The foregoing discussions assumed that reducing carbon emissions meant
reducing use of fossil fuels. This ignores the possibility that carbon
from fossil fuels could be captured and sequestered. Introducing the possibility
of large-scale carbon capture and sequestration radically changes both
the cost and the character of carbon mitigation. Our study considers carbon
capture from power plants and the production of hydrogen from fossil fuel
feed stocks. Costs for these systems are broken down into energy and capital
costs. In addition to the cost of carbon capture there are costs of sequestering
and transporting the carbon.
Electric Power Production: The capture
of CO2 from the waste stream of a plant requires energy. We
assume that the efficiency of carbon capture will increase with time,
i.e., new and improved technologies and processes will come on-line that
will reduce the energy penalty associated with powering the capture systems.
Herzog et al. (1997) state that the eventual integration of these systems
into the overall design of new fossil fueled power plants-such as integrated
gasification combined cycle power plants-holds forth the promise of reducing
the cost of CO2capture significantly. Further, recent research
indicates that targeted basic science programs could lead to advancements
that over time would improve the performance and reduce the costs of these
systems.
Fuel Cell Technology: Fuel cells are
a complementary technology to carbon capture and sequestration. They allow
hydrogen to be employed as a fuel for transportation as well as to produce
heat and power. In the absence of fuel cell technology, the transportation
sector depends on batteries and fuels from biomass for emissions mitigation.
Fuel cells are assumed to be capable of delivering electricity both to
stationary and mobile applications.
Soil Carbon: Over the course of the
next 50 to 100 years, according to the IPCC estimates (Cole et al. 1996),
between 40 and 80 billion metric tons of fossil fuel carbon emissions
might be offset in croplands alone by applying soil carbon sequestration
techniques. The estimates for cropland assume the restitution of up to
two-thirds of the soil carbon released since the mid-nineteenth century
by the conversion of grasslands, wetlands, and forests to agriculture.
The experimental record confirms that carbon can actually be returned
to soils in such quantities: carbon has been accumulating at rates exceeding
one metric ton per hectare per year in former croplands planted to perennial
grasses under the Conservation Reserve Program, through which farmers
establish permanent vegetative cover on environmentally sensitive cropland.
Managed forests, wetlands, and rangelands provide further opportunity
for significant carbon storage. For example, when agriculture is converted
(or allowed to revert) to forest vegetation in systems with very little
management to improve growth, soil carbon may accumulate at rates ranging
from near zero to seven metric tons per hectare per year.
Afforestation and Reforestation: The
forestry sector is modeled explicitly in MiniCAM. We have made no attempt
to model policies to expand the stock of forest carbon, though the model
can easily accommodate an increase in the demand for forests. The increase
in the stock of carbon resulting from afforestation and reforestation
policies represents a one-time removal of carbon from the atmosphere,
and cannot be sustained unless the forests are harvested and the land
replanted. In the latter case the problem of removing the harvested products
from contact with the atmosphere arises. The problem can be overcome if
the harvested materials are used as a commercial biomass feedstock and
as a substitute for fossil fuel energy.
Broadening the Technology Options
Our analysis shows that the introduction of carbon capture and sequestration
from central power facilities, and the introduction of hydrogen fuel cells
as an option for both power generation and transport, would enable the
economy to rely less heavily on carbon-neutral technologies such as commercial
biomass harvesting and solar power (which are at an early stage in their
technological development) to achieve a particular concentration level.
For example, carbon sequestration at power plants and fuel cell use for
electric power generation and transportation could cut the present discounted
cost of satisfying the 550 ppmv constraint by more than 60 percent. Moreover,
if all the potential sequestration options discussed above were combined,
costs for keeping under the 550 ppmv ceiling could be reduced more than
70 percent (see Figure 4).
| Figure 4 | The Effect of Carbon Capture and Sequestration Technologies on the Cost of Meeting Alternative CO2 Concentration Constraints-CBF |
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The costs of alternative emissions concentration ceilings are also highlighted
in Figure 4. For example, under the base case, which assumes no sequestration
of carbon, lowering the target from 750 ppmv to 650 ppmv doubles the cost,
from $266 billion to $529 billion. Similarly, going from a 650 ppmv to
550 ppmv ceiling almost triples the cost, while dropping from 550 ppmv
to 450 ppmv more than quadruples the cost of achieving the concentration
ceiling. Conversely, going from a ceiling of 450 ppmv to 550 ppmv reduces
the costs by a factor of four.
Energy R&D Trends
Substantial investment in energy R&D is justified today, regardless
of which concentration ceiling policymakers may eventually select. This
R&D investment is needed both to develop new, large-scale technologies
that now are not part of the global energy system, and to deploy that
technology widely in the coming decades.
However, energy R&D has declined during the past decade in many OECD
nations. Various reasons help explain this decline, including changes
in productivity of investments, declining energy prices, and changes in
institutions and markets. Regardless of the reasons, this downward R&D
investment trend-which is present in both the public and private sector-reflects
the current assessment of the costs and benefits associated with continued
development of climate technologies. This trend cuts across national lines.
For example, U.S. investment in energy R&D has declined substantially
over the last decade. Total (public and private) U.S. expenditures for
energy R&D declined from $6.6 billion to $4.4 billion (expressed in
constant 1995 dollars), a real decline of 34 percent.
Similar reductions can be seen over the period 1985-1995 in public sector
support for energy R&D in the key countries known to perform such
research (see Figure 5). Approximately 96 percent of the industrialized
world's public sector energy R&D is carried out in only nine countries
(number in parentheses shows country's rank in terms of public sector
support for energy R&D in 1995): Canada (6), France (3), Germany (4),
Italy (5), Japan (1), the Netherlands (7), Switzerland (8), the United
Kingdom (9), and the United States (2) (International Energy Agency 1997).
All of these countries except Japan and Switzerland cut their public sector
investments in energy R&D over this period.
| Figure 5 | Public Sector Support for Energy R&D in Selected Nations,
1985-1995 (Millions of constant 1995 U.S. dollars; percentage indicates real growth from 1985 to 1995) |
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Conclusions
We see no evidence that a single energy technology will sufficiently address
climate change concerns during the twenty-first century. Instead, a portfolio
of technologies that addresses both carbon mitigation and adaptation will
be needed.
Moreover, emissions mitigation can remain modest in the near term, unless
the goal is to sharply constrain atmospheric concentrations of man-made
greenhouse gases. Indeed, the bulk of emissions mitigation in all of the
scenarios we examined occurs in the second half of the twenty-first century.
This implies that the near-term value of a metric ton of carbon is relatively
small, but could rise steadily.
With respect to technology development, we believe that the availability
of carbon capture and sequestration technologies on a global scale would
significantly reduce the long-term cost of emissions mitigation. These
technologies could be an important part of a long-term technology strategy
to address climate change. However, it is important to note that they
reduce cost by expanding the number of mitigating emission options. Capture
and sequestration technologies and fuel cells are likely to meet only
a fraction of total mitigation needs. Most reductions will need to come
from increased use of nuclear power, renewable energy, and conservation
technologies.
The recent decline in energy R&D investment is a major obstacle facing
those who would stabilize atmospheric greenhouse gas emissions by the
end of the twenty-first century. A robust energy technology foundation
will be needed in the decades ahead if the concentration of greenhouse
gases in the atmosphere is to be stabilized. ![]()
Notes
1. Other radiatively important gases include methane, nitrous oxide,
other nitrogen compounds, carbon monoxide, and sulfate aerosols. Important
anthropogenic gases include the chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), hydrofluorocarbons
(HFCs), and perfluorocarbons (PFCs).
2. Some authors have examined the effect of induced technological
change on the timing of emissions mitigation. See, for example, Goulder
and Schneider (1998), Nordhaus (1997), and Grubb (1996). This literature
breaks induced technological change into two types: learning-by-doing
and induced R&D. The general conclusions reached by these researchers
is that the presence of induced technological change tends to move mitigation
activities from the near-term to the far-term when an optimal global tax
policy is implemented (Goulder and Schneider 1998; Nordhaus 1997). The
presence of learning-by-doing has an ambiguous effect on the timing of
emissions abatement. Whether this effect shifts mitigation to the near-term
or far-term depends upon the particular parameterization chosen (Goulder
and Schneider 1998; Nordhaus 1997; Grubb 1996).
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