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The Impact of Tax Reform on U.S. Saving,
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| Table 1 | Saving and Investment as a Percent of Gross Domestic Product, 1973-1995 | ||||||
| United States | Canada | Japan | France | West Germanya | Germanyb | United Kingdom | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
SAVING |
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| Net saving1 | 5.9% | 8.0% | 18.8% | 9.1% | 10.4% | 8.4% | 5.0% |
| Personal saving2 | 6.3% | 6.9% | 11.8% | 7.6% | 8.2% | 8.0% | 4.2% |
| Gross saving (net saving plus consumption of fixed capital)3 | 17.6% | 19.6% | 32.6% | 21.3% | 22.6% | 21.4% | 16.3% |
|
INVESTMENT |
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| Gross nonresidential fixed capital formation | 13.7% | 15.2% | 24.1% | 15.0% | 14.5% | 15.6% | 14.2% |
| Gross fixed capital formation | 18.2% | 21.5% | 30.4% | 21.0% | 20.5% | 22.3% | 17.8% |
| Notes: 1. The main components of the OECD definition of net saving are: personal saving, business saving (undistributed corporate profits), and government saving (or dissaving). The OECD definition of net saving differs from that used in the National Income and Product Accounts published by the Department of Commerce, primarily because of the treatment of government capital formation. 2. Personal saving is comprised of household saving and private unincorporated enterprise. 3. The main components of the OECD definition of consumption of fixed capital are the capital consumption allowances (depreciation charges) for both the private and the government sector. a. The statistics for West Germany refer to western Germany (Federal Republic of Germany before unification). The data cover the years 1973-1995. b. The statistics for Germany refer to Germany after unification. The data cover the years 1991-1995. Source: Derived from National Accounts, Vol. II, 1973-1985, 1981-1993, and 1983-1995. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 1987, 1995, and 1997 eds. Prepared by the American Council for Capital Formation Center for Policy Research, February 1998. |
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International comparisons aside, even more disturbing is the fact that net business investment in this country has in recent years fallen to less than 60 percent of the level of the 1960s and 1970s. Net private domestic investment averaged 8.9 percent of GDP from 1960 to 1980; since 1991, it has averaged only 5.6 percent (see Table 2). The U.S. net private domestic saving rate, a key determinant of U.S. investment, has also fallen sharply from an average of 8.1 percent in the 1960-1980 period to only 5.7 percent of GDP in the 1990s.
| Table 2 | Flow of U.S. Net Saving and Investment Percent of GDP in current dollars; national income accounts basis |
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| Average 1960-1980 | Average 1981-1985 | Average 1986-1990 | Average 1991-1997*** |
|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Net private domestic saving |
8.1 | 7.3% | 5.3% | 5.7% |
|
State and local government surpluses |
2.1% | 1.9% | 1.8% | 1.4% |
|
Subtotal of private and state saving |
10.2% | 9.2% | 7.1% | 7.1% |
|
Less: Federal budget deficit |
-0.8% | -3.8% | -2.8% | -2.7% |
|
Net domestic saving available for private investment |
9.3% | 5.4% | 4.3% | 4.4% |
|
Net inflow of foreign saving* |
-0.4% | 1.2% | 2.4% | 1.2% |
|
Net private domestic investment |
8.9% | 6.7% | 6.7% | 5.6% |
|
Personal saving |
5.4% | 5.7% | 3.8% | 3.6% |
|
Net business saving** |
2.7% | 1.6% | 1.5% | 2.2% |
| *In the 1960-1980 period, the United States sent more
capital abroad than it received; thus net inflow was negative during
this period. **Net business saving = gross private saving - personal saving - corporate and noncorporate capital consumption allowance. ***Includes advance fourth quarter figures for 1997. Source: Department of Commerce Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income Accounts. Update prepared by American Council for Capital Formation Center for Policy Research, February 1998. |
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Numerous scholarly studies by top-flight experts such as Harvard University's
Dale W. Jorgenson, University of California's J. Bradford De Long, Treasury
Deputy Secretary Lawrence Summers, and others conclude that investment
in plant and equipment is the key factor in increasing productivity and
economic growth. Thus, tax policy to promote higher levels of saving and
investment is critical to the United States' future prosperity.
Recent Evidence on the Impact of Tax Policy and Economic Growth
To those who favor a truly level playing field over time to encourage
individual and business decisions to save and invest, stimulate economic
growth, and create new and better jobs, savings (including capital gains)
should not be taxed at all. This view was held by top economists in the
past and is held by many mainstream economists today.
This is primarily because the income tax hits saving more than once-first
when income is earned, and again when interest and dividends on the investment
financed by saving are received, or when capital gains from the investment
are realized. The playing field is tilted away from saving and investment
because the individual or company that saves and invests pays more taxes
over time than if all income were consumed and no saving took place. Taxes
on income that is saved raise the capital cost of new productive investment
for both individuals and corporations, thus dampening such investment.
As a result, future growth in output and living standards is impaired.
While fundamental reform of the U.S. federal tax code continues to interest
policymakers, the public, and the business community, the key question
is whether a totally new system would be worth the inevitable disruption,
cost, and confusion the switch would create. Several new analyses by academic
scholars and government policy experts suggest that substituting a broad-based
consumption tax for the current federal income tax could have a positive
impact on economic growth and living standards. The macroeconomic models
used by the scholars in the studies described below incorporate feedback
and dynamic effects in simulating the impact of adopting either a broad-based
consumption tax or a "pure" income tax.
For example, in "Simulating U.S. Tax Reform," Professors Alan
Auerbach of the University of California and Laurence J. Kotlikoff of
Boston University, Drs. Kent A. Smetters and Jan Walliser of the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO), and David Altig of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
analyze the impact of fundamental tax reform on equity, efficiency, and
economic growth.1
The authors use a general equilibrium model developed by Professors Auerbach
and Kotlikoff to examine five tax reforms spanning the major proposals
now under discussion. Each of the reforms replaces the federal personal
and corporate income taxes, and each is simulated assuming the same growth-adjusted
levels of government spending and government debt. The reforms are a "clean"
income tax and four types of consumption taxes. These consumption taxes
are: a) a "clean" consumption tax; b) a Hall-Rabushka flat tax;
c) a Hall-Rabushka flat tax with transition relief; and d) Princeton University
Professor David Bradford's "X tax."
The clean income tax eliminates all personal exemptions and deductions,
and taxes labor and capital income at a single rate. The clean consumption
tax differs from the clean income tax by permitting expensing of new investment
(meaning that the total cost of the investment is deducted in the first
year). This tax is implemented as a tax on wages with all saving exempt
from tax at the household level, and as a cash-flow tax on businesses.
The Hall-Rabushka flat tax differs from the consumption tax by including
a standard deduction against wage income and by not taxing the rental
value of owner-occupied housing and the value of services provided by
consumer durables. The flat tax with transition relief permits continued
depreciation of capital in existence as of the reform. Finally, the Bradford
X tax combines a progressive wage tax with a business cash-flow tax where
the business cash-flow tax rate equals the highest tax rate applied to
wage income.
Auerbach et al. conclude that switching to a consumption tax can offer
significant economic gains. The Bradford X tax, to which the authors give
the highest marks for its impact on equity, efficiency, and economic growth,
raises long-term output by 7.5 percent and provides no transition relief
from its expensing provisions. It also hits the rich with higher marginal
tax rates than the poor. It is not surprising, then, that in the long
run the X tax helps those who are poor by more than it helps those who
are rich, the authors note. Still, under the X tax there are no long-run
losers; even the rich are better off. Transition relief and adjustments
that prevent adverse distributional effects lessen the positive impact
of tax reform on the economy.
Another recent study, the Joint Committee on Taxation's "Tax Modeling
Project and 1997 Tax Symposium Papers," summarizes the results of
a number of scholars who compared the macroeconomic consequences of a
broad-based unified income tax (a "clean" income tax in Auerbach's
terminology) to those of a broad-based consumption tax.2 Participants
included Roger E. Brinner, DRI/McGraw-Hill; Eric M. Engen, Federal Reserve
Board of Governors; Jane G. Gravelle, Congressional Research Service;
Dale W. Jorgenson, Harvard University; Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Boston University;
Joel L. Prakken, Macroeconomic Advisers; Gary Robbins, Fiscal Associates;
Diane Lim Rogers, CBO; Kent A. Smetters, CBO; Peter J. Wilcoxen, University
of Texas; John G. Wilkens, Coopers & Lybrand; and Jan Walliser, CBO.
The economic impact of a "pure" income tax compared to a "pure"
consumption tax is shown in Table 3. The effects of the consumption tax
proposals on GDP are generally positive over the medium and long terms,
although the magnitude of these effects varies widely. For example, the
Jorgenson-Wilcoxen model predicts that under a consumption tax, real GDP
would be 3.3 percent higher each year in the long run compared to 1.3
percent higher under a unified income tax. The Auerbach, Kotlikoff, Smetters,
and Walliser model predicts even greater gains in the long run (7.5 percent)
under a consumption tax and losses (-3.0 percent of GDP) under a unified
income tax. Similarly, the Engen-Gale analysis shows that the capital
stock would be 9.8 percent higher in the long run under a consumption
tax but 1.6 percent smaller under a unified income tax compared to current
law. The consensus seems to be that the economy would fare better under
a "pure" consumption tax than under a "pure" income
tax or under current law.
| Table 3 | Impact of Tax Reform on GDP and Capital Stock
Growth Percent differences from current tax code baseline |
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| Consumption Tax | Unified Income Tax | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Summary variables | 2005 | 2010 | Long run | 2005 | 2010 | Long run |
|
REAL GDP |
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| Fullerton-Rogers-low1 | - | - | 1.7 | - | - | 1.8 |
| Fullerton-Rogers-high2 | - | - | 5.8 | - | - | 3.8 |
| Auerbach, Kotlikoff, Smetters, & Walliser |
4.0 | 5.0 | 7.5 | -1.7 | -2.1 | -3.0 |
| Engen-Gale | 1.8 | 2.1 | 2.4 | -0.2 | -0.3 | -0.5 |
| Jorgenson-Wilcoxen | 3.6 | 3.3 | 3.3 | 1.6 | 1.4 | 1.3 |
| Macroeconomic Advisers (transition relief) |
1.4 | 1.3 | 5.4 | - | - | - |
| Robbins | 16.4 | 16.9 | - | 14.6 | 15.4 | - |
| DRI Inc./McGraw-Hill | 4.7 | - | - | -1.1 | - | - |
| DRI Inc./McGraw-Hill-"VAT" | -4.2 | - | - | - | - | - |
| Gravelle | 0.7 | 1.0 | 3.7 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 1.8 |
| Coopers & Lybrand | 1.2 | - | - | 1.1 | - | - |
|
CAPITAL STOCK |
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| Fullerton-Rogers-low1 | - | - | 5.2 | - | - | 5.4 |
| Fullerton-Rogers-high2 | - | - | 23.8 | - | - | 11.8 |
| Auerbach, Kotlikoff, Smetters, & Walliser |
14.0 | 19.1 | 31.5 | -4.2 | -5.9 | -10.5 |
| Engen-Gale | 7.0 | 7.6 | 9.8 | -0.7 | -1.0 | -1.6 |
| Jorgenson-Wilcoxen | 0.9 | 0.6 | 0.3 | -2.0 | -2.3 | -2.6 |
| Macroeconomic Advisers (transition relief) |
4.3 | 4.8 | 13.2 | - | - | - |
| Robbins | 47.0 | 57.2 | - | 38.8 | 48.6 | - |
| DRI Inc./McGraw-Hill | 13.7 | - | - | -1.5 | - | - |
| DRI Inc./McGraw-Hill-"VAT" | -0.7 | - | - | - | - | - |
| Gravelle | 1.7 | 2.7 | 11.2 | 0.5 | 0.9 | 4.1 |
| Coopers & Lybrand | 1.5 | - | - | 1.1 | - | - |
| 1. Assumes leisure-consumption (intratemporal) and intertemporal
elasticities both are 0.15. 2. Assumes leisure-consumption (intratemporal) and intertemporal elasticities both are 0.50. Source: Adapted from Joint Committee on Taxation, "Tax Modeling Project and 1997 Tax Symposium Papers," November 20, 1997. |
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In still another new report, "The Economic Effects of Comprehensive
Tax Reform," CBO analyzes the effect of switching from the federal
income tax to a comprehensive consumption-based tax, using a general equilibrium
model developed by University of Texas's Don Fullerton and Diane Lim Rogers
of CBO.3
CBO's analysis shows that substituting a broad-based consumption tax for
an income tax would probably increase national saving and ultimately raise
the living standards of future generations. It would increase the capital
stock and raise the level of national output by between 1 percent and
10 percent, although CBO concludes that increases at the upper end of
that range are unlikely.
The reform might be expected to increase economic efficiency as well as
output for a number of reasons, according to the CBO study. First, the
switch to a consumption base would eliminate the influence of taxes on
the timing of consumption. Second, the new system might treat different
sources' uses of income more uniformly by including more of them in the
tax base and subjecting all of them to similar tax rates. Third, a broader
base would allow lower overall marginal tax rates, reducing the amount
by which taxes affect relative prices and hence all kinds of economic
decisions. CBO notes, however, that efficiency is not the only criterion
to use in judging the desirability of tax reform. Administrative and compliance
costs are other important factors. If a consumption tax offered substantial
gains from reduced complexity, then even a minimal gain in economic efficiency
would be an added bonus.
Another relatively recent study, "Taxation and Economic Growth,"
by Eric M. Engen of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors and Professor
Jonathan Skinner of Dartmouth College, examines evidence on taxation and
growth for a large sample of countries.4 The type of tax system
a country chooses significantly affects that nation's prospects for long-term
economic growth, according to Engen and Skinner. Figures 1 and 2 show
the correlation in the OECD countries between income taxes and economic
growth and between consumption taxes and economic growth over the period
1965-1991. These scatter plots, largely confirmed in regression analysis,
suggest that income taxation is more harmful to growth than broad-based
consumption taxes, the authors note. Engen and Skinner's study also suggests
that tax policy does affect economic growth and that lower tax rates do
enhance economic growth. For example, a major tax reform plan which reduces
marginal tax rates by 5 percentage points will increase growth by 0.2
to 0.3 points.
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Figure 1
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Growth and the Capital Income Tax
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Figure 2
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Growth and the Consumption Tax
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| Source: E.G. Mendoza, G.M. Milesi-Ferretti, and P. Asea. "On the ineffectiveness of tax policy in altering long-run growth: Harberger's superneutrality conjecture." Journal of Public Economics 66 (1): 101-128 (October 1997). Engen and Skinner (1996) cited a 1996 mimeo version of this work. | |||
Even modest growth effects can have an important long-term impact on
living standards, Engen and Skinner note. For example, suppose that an
inefficient structure of taxation has, since 1960, retarded growth by
0.2 percent annually. Accumulated over the past 36 years, the lower growth
rate translates to a 7.5 percent lower level of GDP in 1996, or a net
reduction in output of more than $500 billion annually. Thus, the potential
effects of tax policy, although difficult to detect in the time-series
data, can have potentially very large effects over the long term.
The new studies described above reach the same conclusion about the beneficial
effect on economic growth of switching to a broad-based consumption tax
as earlier research by scholars such as Lawrence Goulder of Stanford University,
Dale Jorgenson of Harvard University, and Joel Prakken of Macroeconomic
Advisers.5
Unfinished Business in Tax Policy Reform: Short-Term Agenda
The long-run goal of U.S. federal tax policy should be to shift toward
a broad-based consumption tax under which all income that is saved is
exempt from tax. In the short term, there are steps forward the Ways and
Means Committee should take and steps backward the Committee should avoid.
With regard to the latter, President Clinton has made proposals, including
revenue raisers, that the Committee must weigh carefully to ensure that
they minimize any negative impact on saving and investment. As to the
former, we will comment on new saving and investment incentives and modifications
to the capital gains law, as requested in the notice of this hearing.
Unfinished Business in Tax Policy Reform: Long-Run Goals
Fundamental reform of the U.S. federal tax code remains a key goal for
many policymakers. I want to take advantage of this opportunity to express
special thanks to Chairman Bill Archer for his dedication and valuable
leadership in this regard.
Other prominent members of Congress, including House Majority Leader Richard
Armey (R-TX) and Senator Richard Shelby (R-AL); Senator Pete Domenici
(R-NM); and Representatives Dan Schaefer (R-CO) and Billy Tauzin (R-LA),
have all introduced legislation to replace the federal income tax with
a broad-based consumption tax. House Minority Leader Richard Gephardt
(D-MO) has proposed broadening the current income tax base while lowering
rates. In addition, other reform plans are being developed. For example,
Senator John Ashcroft (R-MO) has proposed reforming the income tax by
reducing marginal rates and providing a deduction for payroll taxes. Also,
Americans for Fair Taxation, a private group based in Texas, has proposed
replacing the federal income, social security, medicare, and estate taxes
with a 23 percent national sales tax.
In addition to political factors such as voter discontent with the income
tax, several factors contribute to the current interest in tax reform:
| Figure 3 | Effective Tax Rates on Domestic Corporate Investment, 1991 |
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| Note: Tax rates include both the corporate and personal
income tax on investment. Source: Enterprise Economics and Tax Reform (Washington, D.C.: Progressive Foundation, Progressive Policy Institute, October 1994). |
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| Figure 4 | International Comparison of Tax Rates on Foreign Income
Earned by Insurance Companies Operating in a Third Country (By country of residence of parent company) |
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| 1. "Parent" means residence country income
tax on parent company. 2. "Subsidiary" means local income tax on foreign subsidiary. Source: Thomas Horst, The Impact of the U.S. Tax Code on the Competitiveness of Financial Service Firms (Washington, D.C.: American Council for Capital Formation Center for Policy Research, July 1997). |
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Conclusions
Persistently low U.S. saving rates, despite recent good economic growth
and low unemployment, suggest the need for short-term policy measures
to reverse this pattern. In particular, we need to build on the recent
progress in capital gains taxation, IRAs, pension and estate tax relief,
and the AMT. The restoration of an exclusion for dividends and interest
received would also further the goal of lightening the taxation of saving.
In addition, a substantial body of research suggests that fundamental
tax reform and more reliance on consumption taxes could have a profound
positive effect on long-term economic growth. Even small changes in economic
growth rates can make a big difference in living standards. As the United
States faces the economic challenges of the twenty-first century, fundamental
tax reform that moves the U.S. tax system toward greater reliance on consumption
taxes can be an important policy lever for achieving stronger economic
growth and higher living standards.
Endnotes
1. Alan J. Auerbach, David Altig, Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Kent A. Smetters,
and Jan Walliser, "Simulating U.S. Tax Reform," NBER Working
Paper No. 6248 (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research,
October 1997).
2. Joint Committee on Taxation, "Tax Modeling Project and 1997 Tax
Symposium Papers," November 20, 1997.
3. Congressional Budget Office, "The Economic Effects of Comprehensive
Tax Reform," July 1997.
4. Eric M. Engen and Jonathan Skinner, "Taxation and Economic Growth,"
NBER Working Paper No. 5826 (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic
Research, November 1996).
5. Dale W. Jorgenson, "The Economic Impact of Taxing Consumption,"
testimony before the Committee on Ways and Means of the U.S. House of
Representatives, March 27, 1996. Joel L. Prakken, "The Macroeconomics
of Tax Reform," in The Consumption Tax: A Better Alternative?
(Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1987). Lawrence H. Goulder,
"Deficit Reduction through Energy, Income, and Consumption Taxes:
Impacts on Economic Growth and the Environment," Tax Policy
for Economic Growth in the 1990s (Washington, D.C.: American Council
for Capital Formation Center for Policy Research, March 1994).
6. Congressional Budget Office, "Perspectives on the Ownership of
Capital Assets and the Realization of Capital Gains," May 1997.
7. Steven F. Venti, "Promoting Saving for Retirement Security,"
testimony before the Finance Subcommittee on Deficits, Debt Management,
and Long-Term Growth of the United States Senate, December 7, 1994.
8. Enterprise Economics and Tax Reform (Washington, D.C.:
Progressive Foundation, Progressive Policy Institute, October 1994).
9. The Impact of the U.S. Tax Code on the Competitiveness of Financial
Service Firms (Washington, D.C.: American Council for Capital Formation
Center for Policy Research, July 1997).
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